This paper extends the Bertrand-Edgeworth price-setting game with finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms. Taking a market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe, we present a microfoundation of dominant-firm price leadership.
Introduction
In the following we shall consider a homogenous good market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe containing many infinitesimal firms. Our model may be regarded as an extension of the Bertrand-Edgeworth game in which there are finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms.
Mixed measure theoretic models have been considered, for instance, by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) , Shitovitz (1973) , and Okuno et al. (1980) in a general equilibrium framework. Sadanand and Sadanand (1996) used in their analysis a partial equilibrium model containing a dominant firm and a nonatomic competitive fringe in order to investigate the timing of quantity-setting oligopoly games. Our model may be considered as the price-setting counterpart of their model.
In our analysis we will assume that the large firm is the exogenously specified first mover while the small firms follow simultaneously. We will show that our model gives a game theoretic foundation of dominant-firm price leadership. In the dominant-firm price leadership model introduced by Forchheimer (see Scherer and Ross, 1990) there is one large firm and many small firms. Furthermore, the *Tel.: 136-1-387-0834; fax: 136-1-387-0834.É -mail address: atasnadi@matavnet.hu (A. Tasnadi).
0165-1765 / 00 / $ -see front matter © 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. PII: S0165-1765( 00 )00264-0 large firm is able to set the price on the market and the firms in the competitive fringe act as price takers. Therefore, the large producer sets a price by maximizing profit subject to its residual demand curve. The large firm's residual demand curve can be obtained as the horizontal difference of the demand curve and the aggregate supply curve of the competitive fringe. The problem is that this model is not based on the firms' individual profit maximizing behavior since it does not explain the large firm's price-setting behavior nor why small firms act as price takers. A game theoretic foundation of price leadership on a duopolistic market was given by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) . They extended the capacity constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game to a two-stage game with the timing of price decision in stage one. While they assumed constant average costs up to some capacity levels, in our analysis we shall assume strictly convex cost functions. 
s d We will model dominant-firm price leadership by a price-setting game. The price actions of the producers' are given by a measurable function p: V → P that we will call from now on a price profile. Let us denote by 3 the set of price profiles. Proof. We pick an arbitrary set A [ ! of producers and an arbitrary price profile p [ 3. We will construct an increasing sequence f of type V → P measurable functions that converges 
For any e . 0 there exists a d . 0 such that
We can choose a sufficiently large number n [ N so that 
Furthermore, e f v dm v has to be finite since f # g and e g v dm v is finite for any 
for the dominant firm v . The definitions (1) and (2) assume that the dominant firm serves the d consumers at a given price level after the competitive fringe has already sold its supply. However, this assumption is not necessary, but we impose it only for the purely technical reason of avoiding the need to have a competitive fringe setting their prices arbitrarily close to, but below, the dominant firm's price. This simplification has already been applied by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) in their analysis. Now, we are ready to define the profit function of firm Proof. Let the dominant-firm's action be any p [ P. We have to distinguish between three cases: sell its entire supply independently from its rivals' actions and its profit function by Assumption 2.1 increases on the interval 0, p . Therefore, it follows that at price p the dominant firm will sell s p , f g s
In case of (ii) any firm v [ V will not set its price below p because at price p a firm in the fringe 
